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I. Introduction 
Recent theoretical work on the financing of 
investment under asymmetric information has 
emphasized the existence of a shadow price 
differential between internal finance (retained 
earnings) and external finance (debt and stock 
flotations). "Lemons" premia in equity markets 
(as in Myers and Majluf 1984), and credit ra- 
tioning or loan mispricing (as in Jaffee and Rus- 
sell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Gale and Hell- 
wig 1985; Williamson 1986; Bernanke and 
Gertler 1989; and Calomiris and Hubbard 1990) 
imply that external finance will be more costly 
than internal finance (for a review, see Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist, in press). Moreover, the 
Theoretical work on fi- 
nancing costs under 
asymmetric informa- 
tion has linked shifts in 
firms' internal funds 
and investment spend- 
ing, holding constant in- 
vestment opportuni- 
ties. An impediment to 
convincing tests of 
these models is the 
lack of firm-level data 
on the relative costs of 
internal and external 
funds. We use a tax ex- 
periment, the surtax 
on undistributed 
profits in the 1930s, to 
identify firms' relative 
cost of internal and ex- 
ternal funds by calculat- 
ing surtax margins. The 
investment of high- 
surtax-margin firms 
was sensitive to shifts 
in cash flow, holding 
constant investment op- 
portunities. Other firms 
did not display sensitiv- 
ity of investment to in- 
ternal funds. 
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shadow price differential between internal and external finance will 
vary across firms depending on the relative degree of information 
asymmetry and on differences in simple transacting costs. Recent em- 
pirical research using data from the post-World War II period has 
found much evidence for the importance of this cost wedge between 
internal and external finance in explaining firm heterogeneity in invest- 
ment behavior and aggregate sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
(see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Gilchrist 1991; Himmelberg 
1991; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991; Hubbard and Kashyap 
1992; and Whited 1992). This new body of theoretical and empirical 
work has formalized and quantified arguments that have a long history 
in the investment literature (see Butters and Lintner 1945; and Meyer 
and Kuh 1957). 
According to an alternative view, costs of managerial control, rather 
than asymmetric information, can explain observed correlations be- 
tween internal sources of funds ("free cash flow") and investment. In 
contrast to the asymmetric-information approach, costs of managerial 
control imply that restrictions on the availability of free cash flow 
(e.g., increases in promised debt payments) can increase the value 
of the firm by limiting management's command over, and abuse of, 
resources. 
In this article, we employ a new firm-level data set from the 1930s 
which is uniquely suited to measure the shadow value of internal funds 
and relate it to firms' characteristics and behavior. Our sample is 
drawn from manufacturing firms during the rapid recovery, and subse- 
quent recession, of 1933-38. Our data allow us to investigate the poten- 
tial effects of financial constraints on firm growth during the expansion 
and to take advantage of the heterogeneity in our sample to discover 
which firms placed highest value on internal funds and whether these 
firms were sensitive to cash flow disturbances (changes in the supply 
of internal finance). We find that firms that placed high shadow value 
on internal funds also displayed greater sensitivity of investment to 
internal funds. We argue that the characteristics of firms with high 
shadow values for internal funds and high cash flow sensitivity of in- 
vestment are consistent with the asymmetric-information framework 
and cannot be explained as a consequence of the wasteful use of inter- 
nal funds by entrenched managers. 
What has been lacking in existing studies using firm-level data is a 
firm-level index of the marginal costs of external finance. Studies using 
the Q-theory approach model investment as being determined by be- 
ginning-of-period Q (to control for investment opportunities) and a 
measure of internal funds. For firms with high costs of external funds 
(due to asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders regard- 
ing firm prospects), investment will exhibit excessive sensitivity to 
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cash flow, holding Q constant.' In existing studies low initial dividend 
payout ratios or small firm size are typically used as proxies for high 
costs of external finance. In this article, we are able to estimate the 
costs of external finance directly by examining firms' responses to a 
unique tax "experiment" in U.S. history, the undistributed profits 
tax (or surtax on undistributed profits) of 1936-37.2 This tax was a 
surtax on corporate retentions over and above normal corporate taxes. 
Because the maximum marginal tax rate was 27%, most firms had 
large incentives to change their payout policies. Working against this 
response for some firms is the potential difference in the cost of inter- 
nal and external funds. To the extent that the marginal cost of external 
funds is high, a growing firm with profitable investment opportunities 
might choose to pay the undistributed profits tax and invest its internal 
funds, rather than distribute funds and then reacquire them in the 
capital market. Under certain assumptions, the observed undistributed 
profits tax payments for such firms can be used to approximate the 
differential cost of external finance, and variation in the response to the 
tax across firms can be related to variations in investment behavior.3 
Our study of the undistributed profits tax, and its implications for 
measuring the costs of external finance, is also motivated by a specific 
interest in the macroeconomic events of the 1930s. The timing of the 
undistributed profits tax experiment is fortuitous, since the pro- 
tracted recovery from the Great Depression has been attributed by 
Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983) to increases in the costs of external 
finance. From 1934 to 1939, 98% of the investment funds of nonfinan- 
cial corporations were supplied internally; for other periods, from 1901 
to 1929 and from 1946 to 1956, the comparable figure ranged from 55% 
to 64% (Miller 1967, p. 171). Bernanke stressed increases in the "cost 
of credit intermediation" which resulted from deflation-induced reduc- 
tions in firms' net worth (which reduced firms' creditworthiness in 
the presence of leverage constraints) and the weakening and partial 
destruction of the banking system from 1930 to 1933. Bernanke points 
to time-series evidence of links between credit supply shocks (deflation 
and default premia) and investment and to the large excess reserve 
holdings of commercial banks to argue for the importance of credit 
constraints in limiting investment. A maintained assumption of this 
1. See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1991). 
2. Romer and Romer (1990) and Miron (1991) have stressed the value of historical 
policy experiments in models of interest to macroeconomists. 
3. Indeed, opponents of the surtax (which was only effective for 2 years) argued that 
it discriminated against firms with limited (or costly) access to centralized securities 
markets (see Kendrick 1937; Butters and Lintner 1945). Contemporary chroniclers em- 
phasized the effect of bank failures and reduced credit availability from banks in increas- 
ing the shadow price of external finance for many firms in the 1930s. 
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argument is that costs of external finance were large for a significant 
number of firms in the economy. We argue that cross-sectional evi- 
dence from firms' responses to the undistributed profits tax provides 
evidence of very high costs of external finance for a large proportion 
of firms.4 
Finally, the undistributed profits tax provides a significant opportu- 
nity to gauge the comparative importance of the asymmetric- 
information-cost and managerial-control-cost heories for explaining 
the allocative role of cash flow. The tax was passed as a means to 
discipline managers but was repealed largely because it was perceived 
as an impediment to the growth of young, dynamic firms. By investi- 
gating the incidence of the tax across firms, and the changes in divi- 
dend payout in response to the tax, one can gauge the extent to which 
the tax produced unintended costs by raising the costs of financing 
positive net present value projects. 
Section II reviews the history of the surtax on undistributed 
profits, describes its incidence on firms of different sizes, and explains 
our method for identifying the marginal cost differential between exter- 
nal and internal finance. Section III describes our data set. In Section 
IV, we provide some basic summary statistics on the characteristics of 
firms with high costs of external finance, as measured by undistributed 
profits tax margins. We argue that the differences between firms with 
high and low costs of external finance reflect information-related capi- 
tal market frictions. Section V reports regression results relating in- 
vestment behavior (particularly cash flow sensitivity) to differences in 
the costs of external finance. We find that a neoclassical investment 
model with no explicit capital market frictions cannot be rejected ex- 
cept for firms with high surtax margins. The investment spending of 
those firms displayed excess sensitivity to internal funds. In addition, 
working capital accumulation was responsive to cash flow only for 
high-surtax-margin firms, suggesting the use of working capital to 
smooth fixed capital investment when external finance is costly. The 
cash flow sensitivity of investment is attributable to the behavior of 
4. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) report results akin to Bernanke's for the pre-Federal 
Reserve period of U.S. history. Temin (1989) uses panel data for investment to challenge 
Bernanke's view that costs of credit were unusually high during the 1930s. Temin argues 
that if Bernanke's channel were important, industries with low concentration ratios 
(which Temin identifies as more vulnerable to increases in the cost of credit intermedia- 
tion) should have invested relatively less in the 1930s than at other times. Temin finds no 
evidence to support this prediction and therefore dismisses the credit-cost explanation of 
the Great Depression's unusual persistence. Clearly, it would be preferable to measure 
investment response at the firm level by using a direct measure of the shadow cost of 
external finance rather than to rely on comparisons across industries by using the dubi- 
ous proxy of industrial concentration. Indeed, as we show below, firm size (which 
motivatives Temin's use of industry concentration) is a very noisy indicator of external 
finance costs. 
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type C firms with high values of Tobin's Q, which we argue is inconsis- 
tent with a managerial-control-cost explanation of cash flow sensitiv- 
ity. In Section VI, we show that industries with the highest proportions 
of firms with high surtax margins were among the fastest growing of 
the day. Section VII concludes. 
II. Measuring Finance Costs Using Surtax Margins 
The surtax on undistributed profits (SUP) was created to restrict cor- 
porate discretion over retained earnings. Indeed, the SUP taxed all of 
retained earnings, including funds used to finance investment projects. 
By taxing retained earnings it was thought that firm managers would 
be forced to face the discipline of the capital market to finance their 
investments, thus making the capital allocation process more efficient 
(see Berle and Means 1932; Tugwell 1933; Hazlett 1936; and Buehler 
1937).5 The logic of this argument is quite similar to recent theoretical 
models of free cash flow that emphasize potential agency problems 
between management and shareholders of mature firms (Easterbrook 
1984; and Jensen 1986). 
A. The Tax Experiment 
The surtax on undistributed profits appears to have been unantici- 
pated (see the discussion in Blakey and Blakey 1936). No reference 
was made to it in President Roosevelt's budget messages of June 1935 
or January 1936. The proposal was presented by the president in a 
special message to Congress on March 3, 1936, in which he announced 
the need for the tax as a revenue-raising device. Strong opposition by 
key Congressional factions and lobbying efforts by business groups to 
repeal the surtax led to early amendment and repeal of the surtax. The 
surtax survived in its original form through 1937. By 1938, legislative 
amendments reduced substantially the effective surtax rate. The tax 
expired formally in December 1939, in accordance with the Revenue 
Act of 1938. At the time, most observers seemed to agree that the tax 
had a significant effect on dividend payouts only in 1936 and 1937 (see 
Kendrick 1937; Thorp and George 1937; McIntyre 1939; Guthmann 
1940; and Lent 1948). 
The Roosevelt administration proposed the SUP as a substitute for 
the corporate income tax (which would have avoided the double taxa- 
tion of dividends), but Congress added it to the existing corporate tax 
as a surtax on retained earnings. From the beginning there were pro- 
5. Another possible contributor to the intellectual current in support of the surtax 
was the "liquidationist" school of thought, discussed in De Long (1991). According to 
this school, depressions were necessary times of upheaval in which reallocations of 
capital from low-productivity to high-productivity uses occurred. The "discipline" of 
external finance might have been valued as a means to hasten such a transformation. 
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tests against the tax, particularly from small, growing enterprises. 
These firms complained that the tax discriminated against growing 
firms with high costs of external finance. Responses to a Brookings 
Institution survey of firms in 1937 (Kendrick 1937) contained many 
such complaints. In one case a large, dominant firm noted that it had 
gained a competitive advantage as the result of its low financing costs, 
given the greater incidence of the tax on its smaller and younger com- 
petitors. The large firm (perhaps uncharacteristically) argued that this 
was an unfair advantage and suggested repeal of the tax. Many annual 
corporate reports for 1936 contained special statements discussing and 
criticizing the new tax. As a result of these protests, the tax was re- 
pealed in 1938 (see also Lent 1948; and Dobrovolsky 1951). 
The computation of a firm's SUP liability followed a simple rule. 
The marginal tax rate was progressive as a function of the percentage 
of net (after-tax) earnings retained annually, beginning with the calen- 
dar year 1936. On the first 10% of net earnings retained, a firm would 
pay 7% of retained earnings in tax. On the next 10%, it would pay 
12% of retained earnings. On retentions of between 20% and 40% of 
income, a 17% marginal tax rate applied. For retentions between 40% 
and 60% of income, a 22% marginal tax rate was charged. On all 
retentions above 60% of income, the marginal tax rate was 27%. There 
were special exemptions (e.g., for firms with bond covenants that re- 
stricted dividend payments), and there was a small tax credit for firms 
earning less than $50,000 in income. 
The maximum marginal tax rate paid by a firm provides a measure 
of the shadow price differential between external and internal finance 
costs, once one takes proper account of the tax consequences of divi- 
dends and retentions. In the appendix, we provide a method for ap- 
proximating the shadow price differential using the firm's maximum 
tax margin and information on the tax rates applied to dividends and 
capital gains. For example, a firm at the 27% margin paying near-zero 
dividends and seeking to finance new investment projects was willing 
to pay 27 cents to avoid having to raise 73 cents in outside funds. We 
conservatively estimate that the median shadow cost differential for 
such a firm (in present value terms) was likely in excess of 15%. 
Given the avoidability of the tax through dividend payments, one 
might expect that little revenue was actually raised by the tax and that 
very few firms paid the highest marginal rates. While it is true that the 
vast majority of firms increased dividend payout rates in 1936 to limit 
their tax liability under the new law, a substantial number of firms 
paid high marginal SUP rates, and the revenue from the new tax was 
significant. The SUP earned $145 million in revenue in 1936 and $176 
million in 1937, compared to regular corporate tax collections of $950 
million and $1,150 million for 1936 and 1937, respectively. As table 1 
shows, retained earnings as a percentage of after-tax income fell from 
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1935 to 1936 most dramatically for the largest firms in the economy. 
The average retention ratio for all firms fell from 23% to 15.1%. For 
firms with assets of greater than $50 million, the mean retention ratio 
fell from 19.8% to 4.9%. Mean retention ratios in 1936 decline with firm 
size, rising from 4.9% for the largest firms to 35.8% for the smallest. 
Table 2 provides complementary evidence on the distribution of 
highest marginal rate paid on the SUP, conditioning on the size of 
firms measured by income. For firms earning profits (and hence subject 
to the surtax) a substantial fraction paid marginal tax rates of 22% or 
27%. Firms with very low incomes (less than $10,000) avoided high 
tax margins mainly by applying the special tax credit available to firms 
with income less than $50,000. The very largest firms also avoided the 
highest tax brackets, presumably because of their lower costs of exter- 
nal finance. However, for income classes between $10,000 and $1 mil- 
lion, between 17% and 23% of firms paid marginal rates of 22% or 
27%, with roughly 10% of firms in the 27% bracket. The concentration 
of high margins in middle-income ranges may also be due to differences 
across firm sizes in the ability of firms to reduce measured profits by 
adjusting the salary-profit mix of entrepreneur-managers, which was 
especially relevant for very small firms (see Thorp and George 1937; 
and Dobrovolsky 1951). 
B. Direct Evidence of Costly External Finance in the 193QS6 
Independent evidence from surveys by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC; 1941a, 1941b) on the cost of common stock flota- 
tion confirms that costs of issuing securities in the 1930s often were 
large. For example, as reported in table 3, for a sample of 64 firms 
with assets of under $5 million average costs of flotation ranged be- 
tween 20% and 27% of the value of the amount of common stock 
issued. Physical expenses accounted typically for costs of 2% or 3%. 
The remainder was paid as compensation to the intermediary who 
handled the issue. Underwriting insurance costs do not account for 
the bulk of this fee. In 1938 underwritten common stock issuers paid 
an average compensation of 17.5% of the issued amount to brokers, 
while nonunderwritten common stock issuers paid 19.1% on average. 
Recent models of information production by securities intermediaries 
may help explain such high fees. According to Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), for example, costs of public stock brokerage reflect substantial 
costs of gathering information.7 
The view that costs of finance mainly reflect information costs is 
6. In addition to studies of flotation costs, studies using modem data have tested for 
implied cost differences between internal and external equity finance; see, e.g., Asquith 
and Mullins (1986); Masulis and Korwar (1986); and McDonald and Soderstrom (1986). 
7. See also Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984). 
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supported further by comparing the broker's compensation on pre- 
ferred stock and bonds with those on common stock. Compensation 
for preferred stock and bonds sold to the public was substantially lower 
than for common stock and as before was highest for nonunderwritten 
issues. For example, nonunderwritten preferred stock compensation 
to brokers on public issues averaged 12.2% in 1938 for 31 issues, com- 
pared to a 2.7% average for 12 underwritten issues. For bond issues, 
brokers' compensation and physical expenses were roughly compara- 
ble and together small in comparison to stock issue costs. These find- 
ings show that firms faced substantially different marginal costs of 
finance in markets for different types of securities. In equilibrium, 
low-cost forms of finance were rationed to certain firms.8 Comparisons 
of commissions across issues (Mendelson 1967) and across investment 
banking regimes (Calomiris 1995; and Calomiris and Raff 1995) confirm 
the positive association between information costs and commissions. 
In summary, SEC data on the measured costs of public securities 
issues support the evidence in table 2 that a substantial number of 
firms faced a shadow price differential between external and internal 
funds in excess of 20%. Furthermore, differences in costs of finance 
across securities lend support to theoretical models of credit or equity 
rationing based on asymmetric information, which are consistent with 
such market segmentation. 
III. The Data 
We constructed a firm-level data set combining information on income, 
investment, financial structure, dividend payout, firm market values, 
and SUP margins for as many firms as possible during the period of 
recovery from the Great Depression. An extremely valuable primary 
source for firm-level data for our period is the Survey of American 
Listed Corporations (1940), which summarizes data submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for all publicly traded firms. 
These data include detailed information from balance sheets, income 
and expense statements, and records of dividend distributions. 
8. For the sample of publicly traded firms we discuss in succeeding sections, only 
one in four firms issued bonds in 1936. Given the low brokerage costs of bond issues 
and the tax reduction benefits of debt, particularly in the presence of the surtax, it seems 
reasonable to interpret this low participation rate as evidence that many firms simply 
did not qualify for the bond market. Other evidence supports this conclusion. Ten 
percent of the firms in our sample accounted for 90% of firms' bond issues. Participation 
rates in the bond market for large firms (those with assets greater than $100 million) 
were nearly triple those for other firms. The mean size of bond issuers was more than 
triple the mean size of nonissuers. Finally, very few firms were "on the bond margin" 
in 1936. Only 11 firms in our sample of 273 increased outstanding bonds in 1936 or 1937, 
while seven firms showed a substantial decrease. Haven (1940, p. 7) argues that market- 
ing restrictions on low-grade bonds introduced by the Banking Act of 1935 effectively 
restricted bond issues by small corporations in the mid-1930s. 
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Five hundred twenty-eight manufacturing firms appear in the Survey 
data set, which covers the years 1934-38 (with some limited coverage 
of 1939). Many of these firms, however, did not report consistent data 
for the period 1934-36 and hence were excluded from the dataset 
(many more would have been excluded if we had imposed the require- 
ment of data availability for each year during the period 1934-38). 
Other firms were excluded because they did not earn positive profits 
in 1936 and therefore were not subject to the SUP. Still other firms 
were eliminated because stock price data were not available (from 
other sources noted below) for 1935 or 1936 or because taxation and 
dividend data were insufficient to calculate the maximum marginal rate 
of the SUP. These various deletions left us with 273 firms. 
The principal source for data on SUP taxes and dividends was 
Moody's Industrial Manual (various years). In calculating dividends, 
it was crucial to know precisely when dividends were paid, since only 
dividends paid within the calendar year reduced liability for the SUP. 
Furthermore, stock dividends which were not bona fide disbursements 
of funds did not reduce SUP liability, so it was important to distinguish 
dividends by type.9 Moody's was also a useful source of information 
on bond covenants; in a few cases, covenants restricting dividends 
paid (which were allowed by the SUP as an exemption to the tax) 
resolved seeming anomalies between the amount of SUP paid and the 
amount of tax liability implied by retained earnings. Where Moody's 
did not report data on SUP taxes paid, we referred to individual annual 
reports of corporations at the Stanford Business School Library, which 
accounted for roughly half of our data on SUP payments. 
There are three ways to calculate a firm's maximum margin for the 
SUP. One needs any two of the following pieces of information to 
calculate the marginal tax rate: income, dividends, and SUP payments. 
To minimize the possibility of error, we performed the calculations all 
three ways where possible. If any methods led to contradictory results, 
we went back to Moody's and the annual reports to resolve the differ- 
ences. If differences could not be resolved, we dropped the firms. In 
a few cases, SUP payment data were not available even though all 
other data were. For these firms, margins were inferred from data on 
dividends and income and were cross-checked with total corporate tax 
payments to ensure consistency as best we could. We then estimated 
the models described in Section IV with and without these firms. The 
presence or absence of these firms made no difference for any of our 
results, except by improving our sample size and standard errors, so 
we included them in our sample of 273 firms. 
9. As a technical matter, firms could circumvent payment of additional cash dividends 
by distributing certain types of stock dividends (see Rolbein 1939). Firms, however, had 
to prove that such "dividends" increased the effective claims of shareholders. 
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Our estimated surtax margins are for the 1936 calendar year. While 
it is true that firms paid large amounts of surtax in both 1936 and 1937, 
we think the 1936 data are likely to provide a better indication of the 
costs of external finance for our purposes. Both 1936 and 1937 data 
have potential problems. The problem with using 1936 data is that 
firms may have been unable to estimate their true earnings accurately 
by the end of December and so may have paid high surtax rates by 
mistake. We think this is unlikely to be an important problem. The 
end of 1936 marked a continuation of economywide growth that had 
been occurring in the previous 2 years, so firms should have been able 
to estimate earnings reasonably well, particularly given their access to 
current sales data. Furthermore, many firms in our sample paid out 
extraordinary dividends in the last weeks of the year, presumably in 
response to updated information on earnings for the year. 
The problem with using 1937 data is that a severe recession began 
in October 1937. A midyear recession creates two problems for our 
purposes. First, some firms may have overpaid dividends in anticipa- 
tion of continuing earnings that did not materialize-leading to an un- 
derestimate of firms' desired surtax margins. Second, because our bal- 
ance sheet and income statement data are annual, the year 1937 mixes 
two very different environments-an expansion and a recession. Thus, 
investment behavior over the year as a whole may be harder to predict 
on the basis of information available at the beginning of 1937, and the 
relationship between annual investment and annual earnings will be 
complicated by differences in the timing of investment. 
To construct our measure of firm market values we collected end-of- 
year price data for common and preferred stocks for 1935 and 1936 
from the Wall Street Journal and supplemented these price data, where 
necessary, with data from other newspapers and from Moody's. If it 
was not possible to gauge stock prices accurately (e.g., if reported 
ranges of values were large), we dropped the firm. Based on a prelimi- 
nary analysis of bond price data, and on some difficulties disentangling 
bond aggregates from other forms of debt, we decided to value all debt 
at its face value. The small proportion of debt finance for most firms 
(and much smaller proportion of bonds), along with the fact that bonds 
traded very near par for the firms that issued bonds, imply that valuing 
debt at face value is unlikely to generate any important bias. Quantities 
of each stock of each class were taken from Moody's. 
One limitation of our data is the definition of investment. Our mea- 
sure of investment is the change in the book value of fixed capital 
(land, buildings, and equipment). Unfortunately, gross investment data 
are not reported by firms. While capital stock data are not ideal for 
our purposes because of possible idiosyncrasies in the measurement 
of depreciation, we think the strength and robustness of the net invest- 
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ment regressions we report argue for treating the change in book capi- 
tal as a reasonable measure of investment.'0 
IV. Characterizing Firms with High External Finance Costs 
In this section, we describe some of the salient characteristics of firms 
with different external finance costs as measured by the maximum 
marginal rate on the SUP. These descriptions are useful for two rea- 
sons. First, such a description can suggest whether previous empirical 
studies have been correct to associate low dividend payout and small 
firm size with high costs of external finance. Our direct measures of 
external finance costs support these assumptions. 
Second, the characteristics of finance-constrained firms can help one 
to explain the source of high external finance costs and possibly to 
distinguish between the asymmetric-information-cost and managerial- 
control-cost views in explaining firms' reluctance to pay out dividends. 
The asymmetric-information view stresses incentives for retention that 
come from differences in the information insiders and outsiders pos- 
sess about firm opportunities. Asymmetric information limits the sup- 
ply of funds available to some firms, as described in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), Myers and Majluf (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990). In this view, the quintessential high- 
surtax-margin firms would be small, growing enterprises in developing 
industries. According to the managerial-control-cost view, managers 
retain earnings even when they do not possess positive net present 
value projects because they benefit from the indirect consumption of 
free cash flow. Such models of managerial abuse are typically associ- 
ated with large "sunset" firms with low investment opportunities (low 
values of Tobin's Q in Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1994) and low debt 
service ratios, which allow wasteful managers to avoid the risk of 
bankruptcy (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990; Hanka 1992). Thus, 
the two frameworks have clear and different implications for the char- 
acteristics of high-surtax-margin firms. 
A different approach to measuring the importance of the managerial- 
control-cost view is undertaken in a recent paper by Christie and 
Nanda (1994), which analyzes stock price reactions to Roosevelt's 
initial speech proposing a tax on retained earnings and argues that 
their evidence confirms the importance of free-cash-flow problems, 
which motivated the tax. They find greater stock price reactions for 
low-dividend firms in March 1936 and find that the reactions were 
especially large for low-Q firms. We find these results interesting but 
10. This may not be true for periods outside our sample which saw lower levels of 
gross investment. Errors due to depreciation likely were reduced in importance by the 
high investment levels of 1935 and 1936. 
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do not agree with the authors' interpretation of them or with their 
broader interpretation of the costs and benefits of the surtax. First, 
Christie and Nanda omit zero-dividend firms from their sample, the 
inclusion of which would weaken average stock price reaction of low- 
dividend firms (Christie and Nanda 1994, p. 1735, n. 7). Second, Roo- 
sevelt's initial proposal would have substituted the tax on retained 
earnings for the regular corporate tax. For many firms, this could have 
had the effect of increasing available internal funds (after-tax) to fi- 
nance investment. Thus, the stock price announcement effects they 
find around the date of Roosevelt's speech may reflect the relaxation 
of internal finance constraints rather than the elimination of free cash 
flow. In contrast to Christie and Nanda, in attempting to sort out the 
relative importance of managerial entrenchment and costly external 
finance for explaining the consequences of the surtax, we focus on the 
characteristics of firms that chose to pay high and low marginal tax 
rates. It is also important to note that the existence of managerial 
abuse of cash flow does not necessarily imply overinvestment infixed 
capital, which is the focus of our study. Recent studies have suggested 
that entrenched managers may use free cash flow mainly for purposes 
other than fixed investment (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 1994; and Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited, in press). 
To summarize the salient characteristics of the firms in our sample, 
and the differences across firms with different responses to the surtax, 
the tables that follow divide firms into three categories, based on their 
maximum SUP margins in 1936: firms with a 12% or lower maximum 
marginal rate, firms with a 17% marginal rate, and firms with a 22% 
or 27% marginal rate. These divisions correspond to retention rates in 
1936 of less than 20% (type A), 20%-40% (type B), and greater than 
40% (type C). By grouping firms into three categories, we economize 
on reporting and obtain large enough numbers of firms in each category 
to facilitate statistical inference." The results we report do not differ 
qualitatively if we use all five categories rather than the three used 
11. An added advantage to using fewer groupings is the reductions in the possibility 
of measurement error in type classification. Such errors might result from attempts by 
firms to disguise or reduce measured profits to reduce the burden of the surtax. For 
example, in closely held firms, managers would substitute direct compensation for divi- 
dends. Firms would also have incentives to increase advertising and maintenance ex- 
penses if they thought the tax was temporary. Also, the expensing of some forms of 
capital might have led some high-margin firms to accelerate some forms of capital invest- 
ment. This latter effect seems to have been important in explaining investment in oil 
drilling equipment, which was expensed (see Hubbard and Reiss 1988). Thus, so long 
as firms faced upward-sloping cost of fund schedules, these various influences could 
lead us to underestimate some firms' external finance costs. By having few categories 
of firms, we minimize the bias that could come from such possible mismeasurement. In 
fact, our regression results indicate substantial differences in behavior for type C firms 
relative to type A and type B firms. Thus, we believe that few of the highest-margin 
firms avoid detection in our sample. 
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TABLE 4 Characteristics of Firms, by Surtax Margin 
Type A Type B Type C All Firms 
A. Ratio of dividends to 
after-tax profits: 
1935:* 
Mean 1.796 .516 .284 1.061 
Median .705 .512 .051 .530 
SD 9.932 .461 .404 6.809 
N 124 78 64 266 
1936:t 
Mean .950 .696 .463 .759 
Median .888 .689 .478 .731 
SD .629 .303 .374 .532 
N 127 80 65 272 
1937:t 
Mean 1.449 .999 .547 1.102 
Median .855 .747 .516 .762 
SD 4.852 1.165 .448 3.392 
N 124 79 63 266 
B. Total assets: 
1936: 
Mean 119,584 43,344 32,664 76,229 
Median 22,622 13,833 6,426 15,393 
SD 277,456 115,040 72,687 205,969 
N 127 80 66 273 
C. Pretax profit divided by 
book value of net 
worth: 
1936: 
Mean .126 .161 .130 .137 
Median .099 .124 .100 .108 
SD .095 .106 .094 .099 
N 127 80 66 273 
* Seven firms with zero or negative profits are omitted from these tabulations. Of these, three 
are of type A, two are of type B, and two are of type C. 
t Two firms with zero or negative profits are omitted from these tabulations. Both are of type C. 
t Seven firms with zero or negative profits are omitted from these tabulations. Of these, three 
are of type A, one is of type B, and three are of type C. 
here. Our smallest cell contains the 66 firms in the highest-surtax- 
margin group (type C firms), which are roughly evenly divided between 
those with maximum margins of 22% and 27%. The distribution of 
firms in different types closely parallels that of table 2 for firms of 
comparable size, except that type B firms are somewhat overrepre- 
sented, and type A firms somewhat underrepresented in comparison 
to the cells in table 2. In our sample, type A firms account for 47%, 
type B firms for 29%, and type C firms for 24%. 
In tables 4-6, we report means, medians, standard deviations, and 
numbers of firms in each category for various firm characteristics in- 
cluding firm size (total assets in 1936), profit rates (operating profits 
less interest payments divided by book-value net worth), the change 
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TABLE 5 Characteristics of Firms, by Surtax Margin 
Type A Type B Type C All Firms 
A. Ratio of market-to-book value of 
assets: 
December 1935: 
Mean 1.472 1.545 1.306 1.453 
Median 1.216 1.260 .980 1.247 
SD .977 .913 .897 .944 
N 127 80 66 273 
B. Percentage change, ratio of market-to- 
book value of assets: 
1935-36: 
Mean .341 .274 .388 .333 
Median .228 .151 .365 .268 
SD .605 .406 .334 .496 
N 127 80 66 273 
C. Ratio of debt to market value of equity: 
1935: 
Mean .226 .213 .359 .255 
Median .068 .075 .177 .088 
SD .434 .353 .428 .413 
N 127 80 66 273 
1936: 
Mean .178 .188 .255 .199 
Median .077 .089 .149 .097 
SD .272 .287 .267 .276 
N 127 80 66 273 
D. Ratio of debt to book value of equity: 
1935: 
Mean .193 .237 .283 .228 
Median .109 .112 .209 .138 
SD .278 .353 .236 .294 
N 127 80 66 273 
1936: 
Mean .220 .260 .334 .259 
Median .146 .164 .242 .168 
SD .252 .316 .274 .280 
N 127 80 66 273 
in operating profits divided by assets, net operating profits relative to 
sales, the ratio of market-to-book value and its percentage change, and 
dividend payout for each type. These data highlight salient characteris- 
tics of high-finance-cost firms. Table 6 provides supplementary data 
on median standard errors and the statistical significance of differences 
in medians between type A and type C firms. Tests of differences 
across medians are not as sensitive to outliers as comparable compari- 
sons of differences in means. 
Panel A of table 4 reports data on dividends as a percentage of 
after-tax profits in 1935 and 1936 for firms with positive profits. For 
1936, type differences in dividend payout are present by construction, 
since low dividend payout determines firm type. For 1935, however, 
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TABLE 6 Tests of Differences in Medians across Firm Types 
t-Statistic for 
Median Difference in 
Medians of Types 
Type A Type C A and C 
Dividends/aftertax profits, 1935 .705 .051 8.7 
(.074) (.012) 
Total assets, 1936 22,622 6,426 4.0 
(3,962) (581) 
Net operating profits/sales, 1935 .097 .063 3.6 
(.005) (.008) 
Net operating profits/sales, 1936 .119 .090 3.7 
(.006) (.005) 
Change in net operating profits, 
1935-36/total assets 1935 .029 .046 0.3 
(.0002) (.058) 
Change in ratio of market-to-book 
value, 1935-36 .228 .365 2.0 
(.050) (.050) 
Debt/market value of equity, 1935 .068 .177 2.6 
(.009) (.041) 
Debt/book value of equity, 1935 .109 .209 2.5 
(.019) (.034) 
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. 
dividend payout was not affected by the SUP. Table 4 shows that 
dividend payout in 1935 is much lower for firms in higher SUP margins 
in 1936; that is, ex ante low-payout firms tended to pay the highest 
marginal tax rates in 1936. The median payout ratio for type C firms 
is 4%, compared to 51% for type B firms and 70% for type A firms. 
Dividend payout ratios in 1937 are slightly higher than in 1936 for 
each category of firm, reflecting the rapid deterioration of earnings that 
occurred during the recession that began in October. 
Panel B of table 4 reports data on firm asset size by type in 1936. 
Smaller firms tend to be the ones with the highest external finance 
costs (as measured by the surtax). These differences are statistically 
significant and economically meaningful (see table 6). The median firm 
size for type C firms ($6.4 million in assets) is less than one-half that 
of type B and less than one-third that of type A. The large standard 
deviations of firm size in each category, however, indicate that there 
is substantial overlap in the size distributions of the different types.12 
Thus, firm size, per se, may be an imprecise proxy for finance costs. 
Finally, panel C of table 4 provides data on operating profits less 
interest divided by net worth for 1936. Profit rates are similar across 
types, with type B firms showing higher means and medians than types 
12. The large standard deviation for type C asset size is attributable to seven large 
firms at the 22% margin whose mean asset size in 1936 was $211 million. 
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A and C, which are roughly identical. One possibility is that as firms 
progress in the "life cycle" from C to B to A their average profitability 
rises and then falls. An additional fact that is consistent with this inter- 
pretation is that the procyclical change in profits increases in "type." 
Though not shown in table 4, type B and type C firms typically exhibit 
larger profit growth during the boom year of 1936, and smaller profit 
growth in 1937, which saw a cyclical peak in October. Similarly, net 
operating profits relative to sales in 1936 are lowest for type C firms, 
and these firrns show the greatest change in this ratio from 1935 to 
1936.13 The median profit-to-sales ratios are significantly different (see 
table 6). 
Information on firms' financial valuation and financial structure is 
summarized in table 5. Panel A examines the level and growth of 
the ratio of market-to-book value.'4 While mean and median ratios of 
market-to-book value are lower in 1936 for type C firms, the change 
in the median market-to-book-value ratio during 1936 for type C firms 
is 37%, compared to 15% and 23%, respectively, for type B and type 
A firms. These differences in medians are statistically significant, as 
shown in table 6. As Brock and LeBaron (1990) argue, the greater 
procyclicality of firm valuation for type C firms is consistent with some 
models of financing constraints under asymmetric information. Busi- 
ness cycle upswings increase available cash flow (or "financial slack" 
in the language of Myers and Majluf 1984), which relaxes financing 
constraints and increases the value of constrained firms. While all firms 
will experience a rise in value during an expansion, constrained firms' 
stock prices will be more responsive to the cycle. Jog and Schaller 
(1992) find evidence in support of such a difference in a panel study 
of Canadian firms. 
In panels C and D of table 5, we report tabulations of the ratio of 
debt to the market and book value of equity, respectively. We report 
these figures for both 1935 and 1936 to see whether the surtax affected 
firms' financing decisions. That is, by reducing taxable corporate in- 
come, debt finance would have reduced a firm's surtax liability. Using 
13. The measured increases for all types in the ratio of net operating profits to sales 
is possibly surprising given the incentives for firms to increase expenses to avoid the 
surtax (i.e., move forward plans for advertising, and substitute executive compensation 
for owner-managers' capital gains). We take this as an encouraging sign that errors in 
measurement of surtax margins as a consequence of "expense padding" are likely to 
be small for most of our sample. 
14. The values in the top panel of table 5 likely understate values for Tobin's Q in 
the economy. In particular, the average and median values reported in table 5 are likely 
to be less than the true average and median values of Tobin's Q because of the difference 
between replacement cost and book value for firms in 1936. As Kuznets (1961, p. 480) 
shows, the price index for producer durables was 15% lower in 1936 than in 1929, owing 
to the great deflation of 1929-33. Since most capital was purchased prior to the deflation, 
book value was far in excess of replacement cost. 
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the market value of equity, mean debt ratios are higher in 1935 than 
in 1936 for each type, and median debt ratios are higher in 1935 than 
in 1936 for type C firms, and differences in medians across types are 
statistically significant (see table 6). The lower mean debt ratios in 
1936 likely reflect, in part, the growth in stock prices in 1936, along 
with transactions costs of converting existing equity into debt. Using 
the debt-to-equity ratios measured in book value (in panel D of table 
5), all types show an increase from 1935 to 1936 in mean and median 
ratios, indicating an increased role for debt on the margin. 
An interesting feature of the tabulations reported in panel C of 
table 5 is the relatively high ratio of debt to the market value of equity 
in the capital structure of high-surtax-margin firms in 1935 and 1936. 
One interpretation of the high debt ratios of high-surtax-margin firms 
is a greater reliance on financial intermediaries, who finance through 
debt. Financial intermediaries specialize in screening and monitoring 
borrowers and therefore have a greater role in financing firms whose 
prospects are not common knowledge. 15 More generally, many authors 
have argued that direct or intermediated debt contracts are likely to 
arise in environments where asymmetric information about project op- 
portunities or outcomes is important.16 
To summarize, we have argued that firm-level evidence on size, 
profitability, leverage, and stock price changes for firms at different 
surtax margins in 1936, as well as aggregate data on the high flotation 
costs of publicly traded securities, supports our focus on capital mar- 
ket frictions arising from asymmetric information as an important 
source of high costs of external finance for business fixed investment. 
15. Mean ratios of bond debt to assets are essentially the same across types (0.03 for 
type A and type B firms, and 0.04 for type C firms). Thus, differences in debt-equity 
ratios are mainly attributable to short-term debt. 
16. Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson 
(1986) have argued for the importance of ex post asymmetric information. Townsend 
and Gale and Hellwig show that when lenders find it costly to verify firm profits, debt 
contracts will be useful as a means of limiting the states in which verification is required. 
Diamond and Williamson show that intermediated debt further can reduce costs associ- 
ated with ex post bankruptcy penalties and state verification. These arguments predict 
that firms for which ex post information asymmetry is relevant should rely more on 
debt. Moreover, in some models of ex ante asymmetric information (e.g., for some 
cases of the adverse selection model of De Meza and Webb 1987), debt can be beneficial 
when firms differ unobservably in mean returns to firm investments. Firms with higher 
expected project returns prefer debt because it offers them higher expected profits, and 
low-returns firms are obliged to mimic the preferences of high-returns firms. Some 
combination of ex ante and ex post asymmetric information that motivate higher debt 
ratios (along with bankruptcy costs that limit optimal debt ratios) may help to explain 
the cross-sectional differences in the reliance on debt. It is interesting to note, from the 
perspective of the entrenched management motivation behind the undistributed profit 
tax, that theoretical and empirical studies of managerial entrenchment have argued that 
high debt tends to align managerial interests with those of stockholders (e.g., see Harris 
and Raviv 1990; Hanka 1992). 
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To the extent that advocates of managerial control costs have been 
correct in associating those costs with large size, low profits, and low 
debt ratios, our results do not indicate a connection between high 
surtax margins and managerial entrenchment. 
One potential explanation for the absence of "entrenched manage- 
ment" firms from those in the high surtax margin category is that the 
surtax achieved its desired effect, namely, forcing the managers of 
unproductive firms to pay out greater dividends. That is, entrenched 
managers might have feared greater stockholder discipline if they had 
imposed the high costs of the surtax on their stockholders. To investi- 
gate that possibility, we examined the dividend payout choices in 1936 
of firms that were paying very low dividends in 1935 (defined as divi- 
dend payout rates of less than 20%). Table 7 reports data on these 
firms according to their choice of surtax margin in 1936. Interestingly, 
low-dividend-payout firms in 1935 that became high-payout firms (type 
A firms) in 1936 were different from firms that paid low dividends in 
both years. The group that increased its dividend payout the most 
were large firms with lower pretax profit rates, lower Q values in 1935 
and 1936, and lower debt ratios than the firms with low dividend payout 
in both 1935 and 1936. These findings are consistent with the view that 
the surtax was somewhat successful in encouraging low-profit firms to 
pay dividends, and they confirm our previous evidence that firms that 
chose to pay higher surtax rates in 1936 are best described as small, 
profitable firms with high debt ratios that faced high costs of external 
finance, rather than unprofitable firms with entrenched managers. 
V. Investment Behavior and Costs of External Finance 
Following the intuition of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), we 
begin our empirical tests for the effects of differentially high costs of 
external finance on firm investment within the Q-theory approach.17 It 
is well known (see, e.g., Hayashi 1982) that under assumptions of a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology and quadratic adjustment costs, 
the Euler equation for the firm's choice of its capital stock can be 
solved forward to obtain a linear relationship between the investment 
rate (investment I divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock K) 
and marginal Q (using average Q as a proxy): 
(IIK)it = ai + bQit + eit, (1) 
17. An alternative approach to such tests is to estimate directly the Euler equation 
for capital accumulation, as in Gilchrist (1991), Himmelberg (1991), Hubbard and Kash- 
yap (1992), and Whited (1992). We did not pursue this strategy, owing to difficulties in 
constructing a balanced panel with data on firm financial and real variables for several 
consecutive years. 
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TABLE 7 Subsample of Firms with Low Dividend Payout in 1935, Sorted by 1936 
Surtax Margin 
Type A Type B Type C All Firms 
Total assets: 
1936: 
Mean 88,024 22,303 24,291 44,055 
Median 24,660 16,718 6,149 12,493 
SD 134,015 21,965 59,940 89,824 
N 29 25 37 91 
Pretax profit divided by book 
value of net worth: 
1935: 
Mean .035 .065 .070 .057 
Median .017 .047 .033 .032 
SD .053 .076 .128 .096 
N 29 25 37 91 
1936: 
Mean .076 .134 .120 .110 
Median .063 .119 .087 .086 
SD .054 .094 .094 .086 
N 29 25 37 91 
Ratio of market-to-book value 
of assets: 
December 1935: 
Mean 1.214 1.128 1.329 1.237 
Median .864 .925 .947 .902 
SD 1.068 .702 .924 .914 
N 29 25 37 91 
December 1936: 
Mean 1.654 1.570 1.733 1.633 
Median 1.330 1.107 1.602 1.330 
SD 1.559 1.082 .978 1.206 
N 29 25 37 91 
Ratio of debt to book value 
of equity: 
1935: 
Mean .304 .423 .324 .345 
Median .160 .262 .291 .237 
SD .487 .560 .221 .424 
N 29 25 37 91 
NOTE.-LOW dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividends to aftertax profits of less than 
20%. 
where i and t denote the firm and time, respectively, a represents the 
normal or average level of the investment rate, b is the inverse of the 
coefficient on the quadratic adjustment cost term, and e is an estima- 
tion error. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, Q summarizes mar- 
ket expectations about the profitability of the firm's investment oppor- 
tunities; e is an expectational error term. In particular, adding extra 
terms as proxies for internal funds (e.g., anticipated "cash flow") 
known to the stock market should add no marginal predictive content 
for investment. That is, denoting anticipated "cash flow" (net profit 
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from operations less interest expense and taxes) by CF, one would 
expect, under the null hypothesis of efficient capital markets and no 
cost differential between internal and external funds, that the coeffi- 
cient c in the augmented regression, 
(I/K)it = aa + bQit + c(CF/K)it + eits (2) 
should be zero. The Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen approach grouped 
firms into a priori "constrained" and "unconstrained" sets based on 
long-run dividend payout patterns and tested for intergroup differences 
in the coefficients. 
The surtax experiment gives a clear suggestion for identifying the 
source of cross-sectional heterogeneity: firms with low surtax margins 
are a priori less likely to face differentially costly external finance. 
Indeed, in many cases these firms turned to external markets to raise 
funds in order to increase dividend payments, thereby reducing surtax 
payments. As we show in the appendix, the maximum SUP margin 
can provide a measure of the shadow cost of external finance. 
In this reduced-form approach, firms in higher maximum SUP mar- 
gins (those with higher costs of external finance) will have greater 
sensitivity of investment to shifts in internal funds, holding constant 
differences in cash flow and investment opportunities. We investigate 
this proposition in table 8, which reports results for regressions with 
investment relative to fixed capital as the dependent variable (i.e., 
the percentage change in fixed capital from 1935 to 1936).18 In these 
regressions the market-to-book value ratio (Q) in 1935 is included as 
a proxy for investment opportunities;"9 the (CFIK) term is defined as 
cash flow during 1935 and 1936, divided by fixed capital in 1935. The 
first regression constrains the intercept, the coefficient on Q, and the 
cash flow responsiveness of investment to be identical across different 
types of firms, while the second regression allows them to vary across 
firm types. Regressions are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using 
White's (1980) procedure. 
Our results provide broad support for the simple approach discussed 
above. In the aggregated regression, both Q and cash flow enter posi- 
tively, but the cash flow effect is small and statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient on Q is large relative to previous estimates, indicating 
lower and more plausible adjustment costs than those implied in the 
estimates by Summers (1981), Salinger and Summers (1983), Fazzari, 
18. One can also argue that the intercept terms should be lower for high-surtax-margin 
firms-i.e., that higher financing costs not captured by cash flow and Q should reduce 
investment for any given levels of cash flow and Q. Indeed, we find that the intercept 
for net investment is zero for type A and type B firms but substantially negative for 
type C firms. 
19. We collected market-value data for firms in 1935 and 1936 only. Data for earlier 
years often were not available. 
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TABLE 8 Fixed Capital Investment Regressions, 1936 
Regressions 
(1) (2) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable I1936/K1935 1936/K,935 
Number of observations 244 244 
Adjusted R2 .063 .217 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant - .019 .015 
(.022) (.021) 
Type B ... -.037 
(.036) 
Type C ... -.112 
(.051) 
Q1935 .044 .024 
(.016) (.011) 
Q1935 x type B . .024 
(.019) 
Q1935 x type C ... .039 
(.051) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K,935 .018 -.004 
(.016) (.014) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)1K1935] x type B ... .003 
(.018) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935] x type C ... .248 
(. 100) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), and others. The results allowing for 
surtax-margin heterogeneity reveal that the sensitivity of investment 
to internal funds is concentrated in the type C firms. In all the regres- 
sions, type A and type B firms exhibit no responsiveness of investment 
to changes in cash flow after taking account of investment opportuni- 
ties measured by Q. For type C firms the coefficient is large and statis- 
tically significant.20 Allowing for heterogeneity in effects of internal 
funds on investment raises the adjusted R2 of the regression from 0.06 
to 0.22. 
These results are not likely attributable to greater measurement error 
in Q for type C firms (and hence greater marginal information contrib- 
uted by cash flow). If measurement error in Q were relatively large 
for type C firms, then one would expect the coefficients on Q for type 
C firms to be relatively small. However, the opposite is the case. In 
the regressions that allow the coefficient on Q to vary by type, type 
B and type C firms have larger estimated Q coefficients than type A 
firms. 
There are potential problems with this simple reduced-form ap- 
20. As we noted before, the only intercept term that is significantly difficult from zero 
is that for type C firms. 
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TABLE 9 Fixed Capital Investment Regressions, 1936 
Regressions 
(3) (4) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable I1936/K1935 I1936/K,935 
Number of observations 244 244 
Adjusted R2 .075 .197 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant - .014 .014 
(.021) (.021) 
Type B ... -.034 
(.035) 
Type C ... -.080 
(.057) 
Q1935 .038 .026 
(.014) (.011) 
Q 1935 x type B ... .019 
(.019) 
Q 135 x type C ... .061 
(.047) 
CF1935/K,935 .059 -.019 
(.043) (.028) 
CF1935/K1935 x type B ... .023 
(.036) 
CF1935/K,935 x type C ... .295 
(.129) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
proach, of course, stemming from difficulties in measuring marginal Q 
and identifying Q as a reasonable proxy for "fundamentals" owing 
to possible lapses of stock market efficiency (see, e.g., Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg 1994). Furthermore, alternative structural models may 
explain why internal net worth variables appear in the investment 
equation (Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). Nevertheless, we believe that 
significant intuition is gained from the reduced-form approach, given 
our identification of external finance cost differentials through firm- 
level responses to the surtax. In light of the potential problems with 
the reduced-form approach, we perform four additional tests to 
strengthen our conclusion. 
First, we investigate whether the cash flow effect in the investment 
equation is attributable to contemporaneous cash flow. Contemporane- 
ous cash flow may be related to investment through reverse causation 
or because it contains new information about firms' long-run earnings 
prospects. We confront this potential problem by estimating reduced- 
form equations excluding 1936 cash flow from our cash flow measure. 
Results from these regressions are reported in table 9. The results are 
similar to the regressions reported in table 8. As before, only type C 
firms show significant responsiveness to internal finance. 
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Second, to provide an additional examination of the possibility that 
the effect of cash flow on investment may be simply a proxy for effects 
of other variables, we incorporated a set of other right-hand-side vari- 
ables in the reduced-form Q model, including sales growth, firm size 
(total assets), lagged I/K, and the change in Q from 1935 to 1936; 
results are reported in table 10. The inclusion of these additional vari- 
ables reduced the sample size from 244 to 232 firms. The estimated 
sales growth coefficients in 1935 and 1936 do prove significant in these 
regressions, but the estimated coefficients on cash flow variables are 
essentially the same. While the standard errors are higher (owing to 
the smaller sample and the increased number of regressors), the cash 
flow effect remains large and statistically significant for type C firms. 
Third, we tested for additional effects of cash flow on changes in 
working capital. Firms with high costs of external finance and excess 
sensitivity of investment to changes in cash flow will have an incentive 
to "self-insure" against variation in internal funds by accumulating 
working capital during periods when cash flow is high and decumulat- 
ing working capital during periods when cash flow is low.21 If working 
capital serves as a buffer to reduce the variation in fixed investment 
caused by variation in cash flow, then for type C firms, working capital 
investment will respond even more to changes in cash flow than fixed 
capital investment. 
To test this, in tables 11 and 12 we estimate equations similar to 
those reported in tables 8-10, but with the change in working capital 
as the dependent variable (normalized, as throughout, by fixed capital). 
In these regressions there is no clear null hypothesis for the coefficient 
on cash flow (as there is in the Q-theory model for fixed investment), 
but we find the heterogeneity of our reduced-form coefficients on cash 
flow across the various types to be suggestive, particularly after con- 
trolling for sales growth and other variables. The coefficients on cash 
flow are much larger for type C firms than for others, and much larger 
than the comparable type C cash flow coefficients in tables 8-10. Inter- 
estingly, type B firms also show significant cash flow sensitivity of 
working capital accumulation, although the magnitude of the effect is 
much smaller than for type C firms. These results are consistent with 
the view that firms with high external finance costs rely on working 
capital as a buffer to reduce the effects of cash flow variation on fixed 
investment.22 
21. Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (in press) 
argue that working capital plays an important role in allowing firms to avoid costs of 
adjustment in fixed capital investment. 
22. Similarly, Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (in press) find that firms with the 
lowest costs of external finance (commercial paper issuers) display no cash flow sensitiv- 
ity of either fixed investment or working capital, while other firms which display no 
cash flow sensitivity of fixed investment often display significant sensitivity of working 
capital to cash flow. 
TABLE 10 Fixed Capital Investment Regressions, 1936 
Regressions 
(5) (6) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable I1936/K1935 I1936/K1935 
Number of observations 232 232 
Adjusted R2 .268 .253 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant - .015 - .013 
(.021) (.020) 
Type B -.060 -.061 
(.063) (.063) 
Type C - .133 - .127 
(.093) (.088) 
Q 1935 .005 .008 
(.013) (.013) 
Q1935 x type B .032 .024 
(.025) (.025) 
Q 1935 x type C .032 .055 (.063) (.057) 
(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935 .005 . 
(.013) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935] x type B (3.43E -004(.020) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K,935] x type C .229 ... (.122) 
CF19351KI935 . .. - .005 (.024) 
CF19351Kx935 X type B . .. .027 (.038) 
CF19351Kx935 X type C . .. .266 (.172) 
I1935/K,934 ( 1.284 .286 (.158) (.159) 
I1935/K1934 x type B - .290 - .290 (.166) (.167) 
I1935/Kx934 X type C - .030 - .073 (.299) (.300) 
%Asales1935 .073 .072 
(.058) (.059) 
%Asales1935 X type B - .233 - .228 (.174) (.172) 
%Asales1935 x type C .022 .053 
(.178) (.178) 
%Asales1936 .192 .185 
(.091) (.090) 
%Asales1936 x type B .202 .214 
(.278) (.279) 
%Asales1936 x type C .001 .017 (.290) (.328) 
Q1936 - Q1935 - .007 - .008 (.020) (.020) 
(Q1936 - Q193s) x type B .026 .029 (.036) (.037) 
(Q1936 - Q193s) x type C .045 .072 (.133) (.144) 
Total assets1936 - 3.34E - 09 - 4.48E - 09 
(2.47E-08) (2.48E-08) 
Total assets1936 X type B 6.24E - 08 7.07E - 08 
(9.45E - 08) (9.54E - 08) 
Total assets1936 x type C - 7.96E - 08 - 1.97E - 07 
(1.44E - 07) (1.88E - 07) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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TABLE 11 Change in Working Capital Regressions, 1936 
Regressions 
(1) (2) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable A WK1936/K1935 A WK1936/K1935 
Number of observations 244 244 
Adjusted R2 .276 .209 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant -.016 -.017 
(.047) (.048) 
Type B -.025 -.031 
(.076) (.079) 
Type C -2.11 -.149 
(.385) (.300) 
Q1935 .054 .046 
(.040) (.037) 
Q1935 x type B - .026 .002 
(.067) (.068) 
Q1935 x type C .171 .354 
(.257) (.355) 
(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935 -.028 ... 
(.056) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935] x type B .214 ... 
(.061) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935] x type C 1.005 ... 
(.737) 
CF19351KI935 . . . -.023 
(.093) 
CF19351K1935 x type B ... .390 
(. 100) 
CF19351K1935 x type C ... .841 
(1.447) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Finally, we also investigate whether the cash flow sensitivity of fixed 
capital and working capital can be explained by managerial-control 
costs, following a similar approach to Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1994). 
They suggest that Q may be a useful conditioning variable for this 
purpose because managerial entrenchment should be more clearly 
identifiable in the behavior of low-Q firms. In contrast, according to 
the asymmetric information view of high external finance costs, cash 
flow sensitivity should be higher for high-Q firms because the shadow 
cost of external finance is an increasing function of the firm's true Q 
value (as shown in the appendix). We divide our type C firms into two 
groups of equal size-high-Q and low-Q-and test to see whether the 
cash flow sensitivity of investment in fixed capital and working capital 
is different for these two groups. The results for fixed investment are 
reported in table 13. Our results are striking. Only high-Q type C firms 
exhibit any cash flow sensitivity of investment, and these effects are 
larger and more statistically significant than for the class of type C 
TABLE 12 Change in Working Capital Regressions, 1936 
Regressions 
(3) (4) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable A WK1936/K1935 A WK1936/K,935 
Number of observations 232 232 
Adjusted R2 .455 .421 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant -.130 -.136 
(.056) (.062) 
Type B -.010 -.014 
(.089) (.093) 
Type C .070 .190 
(.319) (.359) 
Q 1935 .032 .021 (.037) (.035) 
Q1935 x type B - .010 .009 (.068) (.065) 
Q1935 x type C .152 .180 
(.246) (.259) 
(CF1935 + CF1936)/KI935 -.002 ... (.055) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K1935] x type B .180 * 
(.058) 
[(CF1935 + CF1936)/K,935] x type C 1.313 ... (.525) 
CF1935/K,935 . . . .048 (.081) 
CF19351KI935 x type B . .. .312 (.087) 
CF19351KI935 x type C ... 2.636 (1.038) 
I1935/KI934 .007 - .006 (.086) (.082) 
I1935/K,934 x type B -.047 .014 (.209) (.200) 
I1935/K,934 x type C - .608 - 1.309 (.505) (.783) 
%Asalesl935 .182 .185 
(.139) (.145) 
%Asalesl935 x type B .169 .186 
(.247) (.250) 
%Asalesl935 x type C .991 1.095 
(.666) (.716) 
%Asalesl936 .609 .642 (.281) (.284) 
%Asalesl936 X type B -.210 -.209 
(.336) (.334) 
%Asales1936 X type C - .956 - 1.271 
(.896) (1.070) 
Q1936 - Ql935 - .062 - .061 (.052) (.052) 
(Q1936 - Q1935) x type B - .106 - .103 (.105) (.105) 
(Q1936 - Q1935) x type C - .706 - .353 (.512) (.517) 
Total assets1936 - 5.23E - 08 - 4.99E - 08 
(6.13E - 08) (6.38E - 08) 
Total assetsI936 X type B 2.30E - 08 1.02E - 08 (1.36E - 07) (1.42E - 07) 
Total assets1936 X type C - 9.86E - 07 - 1.29E - 06 
(7.05E - 07) (8.32E - 07) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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TABLE 13 Fixed Capital Investment Regressions, 1936 
Regression 
(1) (2) 
A. Summary statistics: 
Dependent variable I1936/K,935 I1936/K,935 
Number of observations 244 232 
Adjusted R2 .240 .325 
B. Coefficients: 
Constant .014 .004 
(.021) (.023) 
Type B -.034 -.070 
(.035) (.064) 
Type C -.066 -.203 
(.056) (.071) 
Q 1935 .026 .001 
(.0121) (.013) 
Q1935 x type B .019 .039 
(.019) (.021) 
Q1935 x type C .023 .039 
(.050) (.043) 
CF19351KI935 - .019 - 1.1OE-04 (.028) (.023) 
CF19351KI935 x type B .023 .014 
(.036) (.035) 
CF19351KI935 x type CLQ* .079 4.13E - 04 
(.031) (.035) 
CF19351KI935 x type CHQ* .471 .504 (.132) (.187) 
I1935/K,934 x type B . . . -(13?.294 (.15 1) 
I1935/K,934 x type B . . . - .306 (.159) 
I1935/K,934 x type C . . . -(.028 (.211) 
%Asales1935 . . . .023 
(.041) 
%Asales1935 x type B ... -( 121 
(.127) 
%Asales1935 x type C ..0. - 40 
(.127) 
%Asales1936 . . . .205 
(.095) 
%Asales1936 x type B . .. .059 
(.182) 
%Asales1936 x type C . .. .012 
(.150) 
Q 1936 Q 1935 . . . .043 
(.025) 
(Q 1936 Q 1935) x type B . .. .049 
(.054) 
(Q 1936 Q 1935) x type C . .. .210 
(.184) 
Total assets1936 . . .- 5.07E -09 
(2.55E -08) 
Total assets1936 x type B . .. 6.36E -08 
(9.68E - 08) 
Total assets1936 x type C . .. 9.57E - 08 
(1.23E -07) 
NOTE.-Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
* Type CHQ firms are type C firms with higher than median Q in December 1935. Type CLQ 
firms are those with lower than median Q in December 1935. 
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firms as a whole. We found similar differences in working capital re- 
gressions not reported here. These results provide strong evidence that 
the cash flow sensitivity of investment cannot be attributed to the 
waste of free cash flow by entrenched managers. 
To summarize, we estimated versions of a neoclassical investment 
model controlling for firms' investment opportunities using Tobin's Q 
(and sales growth). The inclusion of proxies for internal funds could 
be rejected for firms that avoided high margins of the surtax on un- 
distributed profits by increasing dividends. For profitable firms with 
low dividend payout and high surtax margins, we could not reject 
an effect on investment spending of internal funds, holding constant 
investment opportunities.23 These results are robust to changes in the 
definition of internal funds-in particular the use of only lagged inter- 
nal funds-in the regressions and are not easily explicable by appeal 
to measurement error in Tobin's Q. The results are much stronger for 
high-Q type C firms. Finally, high-surtax-margin firms show a much 
higher propensity to adjust working capital in response to changes in 
internal funds, in a manner consistent with a buffer-stock view of the 
function of working capital. 
VI. Measured Capital Market Frictions and Growing Firms 
Using firms' marginal surtax rates, we showed above that a simple 
formulation of the effects on investment of financing costs and invest- 
ment opportunities (through the Q model) supports the economic and 
statistical significance of both. Consistent with models of capital mar- 
ket frictions, the investment of firms paying the highest rates of surtax 
was sensitive to shifts in both firms' opportunities and internal funds. 
These results would have come as no surprise to critics of the surtax, 
who argued that young, growing firms with high costs of external fi- 
nance bore the brunt of the tax. These critics (see, e.g., Merwyn 1942; 
and Butters and Lintner 1945), many of whom pushed for repeal of 
the surtax from its inception, were particularly concerned about the 
surtax's effect on growing industries. Table 14 reports the numbers of 
firms of types A, B, and C for each of the industries enumerated in 
the Survey of Listed Corporations, our data source. Also reported are 
(i) the fraction of firms in each industry that are in type C and (ii) the 
growth rate of the industry's fixed capital stock (measured in constant 
dollars) over the period from 1937 to 1948. We calculated the latter to 
examine whether the industries with significant representation of type 
C firms in fact were (ex post) the "growth industries" of the period. 
23. It is not possible to offer a quantification of this effect without a structural model 
of the role of internal funds. Such models have been developed (see n. 17), but imple- 
menting this approach requires a panel data set of many years, which we lack. 
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It is not possible to make precise statements about the correlation 
of the importance of type C firms and industry growth because the 
industry classification reported in the data does not match exactly the 
U.S. census Standard Industrial Classification definition of industries. 
Nonetheless, some patterns are noteworthy. The fixed capital stocks 
of the four industries with at least 50% of sample firms in type C 
(agricultural machinery, aircraft, engines and turbines, and tires) grew 
significantly faster than the average for the manufacturing sector.24 It 
is also possible that other type C firms were in relatively fast-growing 
segments of their respective industries. To summarize, the character- 
ization of type C firms (the investment behavior of which is affected 
by financial constraints) as being disproportionately concentrated in 
growing industries appears to be accurate, providing support for con- 
cerns of contemporary chroniclers.25 
VII. Conclusion 
Recent theoretical models have linked firms' internal funds and invest- 
ment spending in environments where external funds are more costly 
than internal funds. An important impediment to convincing tests of 
these models has been the identification of firm-level differences in the 
costs of external finance. The surtax on undistributed profits in the 
1930s offers a rare opportunity to measure the shadow price differential 
between internal and external finance and thereby measure the impor- 
tance of external finance constraints associated with a "financing hier- 
archy" in determining investment behavior. In addition, firm-level 
analysis of investment and financing costs for the 1930s provides com- 
plementary evidence to Bernanke's (1983) time-series analysis and can 
help to verify whether recovery from the Depression was likely to 
have been delayed by high costs of financing investment. 
Our results make some progress on both fronts. Nearly one-fourth 
of publicly traded manufacturers in our sample had maximum SUP 
margins of 22% or 27%. The cash flow sensitivity of fixed investment 
24. This does not imply that firms in types A or B were only in slow-growing indus- 
tries. The capital stock of the petroleum industry grew rapidly over the period, and only 
relatively large, mature oil firms were in the sample. 
25. Using the Euler equation approach to estimating impacts on financing constraints 
on capital spending, Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (in press) find effects of cash 
flow on investment, holding constant investment opportunities, only for firms with low 
presample dividend payouts. To test whether low payout was symptomatic of mature 
firms with high current profitability, they constructed a sample of mature, low-payout 
firms (large firms in the mature, concentrated industries, identified by Domowitz, Hub- 
bard, and Petersen 1987); there was no effect of cash flow on investment for these firms. 
Of course, while the entrenched management problem does not appear to explain the 
effect of internal funds on new investment in plant and equipment, it may explain other 
types of non-value-maximizing behavior (for a detailed discussion, see Jensen 1986; and 
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1994). 
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by these firms alone accounts for the overall sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow in our data, after controlling for investment opportunities. 
Many firms with high surtax margins were concentrated in the growing 
industries of the day. The sensitivity of capital spending to internal 
funds for high-surtax-margin firms appears to reflect information- 
related capital market frictions as opposed to the waste of corporate 
cash flows by entrenched managers. 
Our results also contain implications for fiscal and monetary policy. 
Our finding that internal finance can have an important allocative role 
in investment implies that the social costs of taxing firms' profits may 
include allocative distortions from reductions in internal finance for 
some firms. These costs are borne disproportionately by young, grow- 
ing firms which suffer asymmetric information problems. The high 
costs of external finance and the existence of a financing cost hierarchy 
also lend credence to viewing changes in the credit supply of intermedi- 
aries specializing in monitoring firms as an important channel of mone- 
tary policy.26 
Appendix 
Approximating External Finance Cost Using the Surtax 
It is possible to obtain an estimate of the cost differential between external 
and internal finance using estimates of the maximum surtax rate paid and 
other data. Consider the case of an all-equity-financed firm, in which dividend 
payments do not affect the required rate of return on the firm's equity (the 
"tax capitalization" model of dividends and investment formulated by King 
1977; Auerbach 1979; and Bradford 1981). Define the following variables: 
p = taxable profits, 
D = dividends, 
v = personal income tax rate, 
c = accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate, 
t = corporate income tax rate, 
y = dividend payout rate (D/(1 - t)p), 
u = average surtax rate on undistributed profits, 
s = cost of raising a dollar in external funds, 
q = shadow value of an additional dollar's investment, and 
V = value of the firm. 
Note that since after-tax profits are given by 
(I - t)p - u(y), [(I - t)p - D]9 
26. We have argued that the SUP offers a way to identify the incidence of "financing 
constraints" across firms. Firm heterogeneity in investment, employment, or production 
responses to monetary policy would provide another example (see Gertler and Hubbard 
1989; and Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). 
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an increase in dividends (dD) reduces the surtax liability of the firm by 
[u(y) + (y - 1)u'(y)]dD. 
Consider an experiment in which a firm increases dividend payments by one 
dollar, while raising an additional dollar of equity. The effect on firm value is 
given by 
(1 - v) + q(l - c)[u(y) + u'(y)(y - 1)] - (1 + s). 
The first term reflects the value to shareholders of an additional dollar of 
dividends. The second term represents the value of reinvested savings from 
reduced surtax liability. The cost of an additional dollar of external finance is 
(1 + s). Note that if u = s = 0, a firm would issue new shares only if q were 
greater than one. 
For our purposes, an interesting benchmark is the responsiveness to the 
surtax on undistributed profits of firms initially paying zero dividends, for 
which [u(y) + (y - 1)u'(y)] is at its maximum of 0.27. If the dividend payout 
ratio does not change ex post, it must be the case that 
(0.27)q(1 - c) - v < s. 
Poterba's (1987) estimates of c and v for 1935 (just prior to the imposition of 
the surtax) are 0.06 and 0.24, respectively. Assuming q = 1.5, the implied 
cost premium is roughly 15%. A value of 1.5 for q may be conservative for 
many zero-dividend firms. As we have argued, type C firms were often young, 
high-growth firms. Moreover, estimates of market-to-book value reported in 
table 5 show an average for type C firms of 1.3 in December 1935 and 1.7 in 
December 1936. Replacement cost for producer durables was much lower than 
book value for these firms, whose equipment would have been purchased prior 
to the great deflation of 1929-33. Kuznets (1961, p. 480) estimates that the 
cost of producer durables was 15% lower in 1936 than it was in 1929. Adjusting 
for this decline would raise the estimated market evaluation of q for type C 
firms in December 1935 to a median of 1.16 and a mean of 1.5, assuming all 
capital was purchased in 1929. Finally, in the presence of asymmetric informa- 
tion, as Myers and Majluf (1984) argue, the true q, as known to insiders, could 
be substantially greater than the market estimate. Thus, a q value of 1.5, and 
an implied value for s of 15% for zero-dividend firms, seems conservative. 
Our approach to estimating s may be conservative for two additional rea- 
sons. First, we do not allow any direct effect from dividend policy to firm 
valuation (as models based on dividend valuation for purposes of signaling or 
managerial discipline would imply). Second, for firms paying zero dividends, 
our estimates are a lower bound because those firms are at a corner solution. 
One potentially offsetting effect, which could lead us to overestimate s, is 
the possibility that stockholders of high-margin firms faced unusually high 
personal tax rates on dividends. As implied by our calculations above, the 
higher is the personal tax rate on dividends, the lower is the estimate of s. 
Some closely held, credit-constrained firms with low expected dividend payout 
may have been controlled by stockholders facing higher than average marginal 
dividend rates. However, data on stockholders' marginal tax rates are not 
available on a firm-specific basis. 
The possibility that some high-surtax-margin firms may have not faced high 
shadow costs of finance may help to explain the results reported in table 13. 
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If high-surtax-margin firms controlled by high-personal-tax-margin stockhold- 
ers had lower q values than the other high-surtax-margin firms (because their 
true s values were lower and therefore they were less constrained in their 
ability to invest), then that could contribute to the lower estimated cash flow 
sensitivity of investment for high-surtax-margin firms with lower than median 
q. Of course, even if all high-surtax-margin firms' stockholders faced the same 
marginal tax rates on dividends, we would still expect high-surtax-margin firms 
with higher q to display greater cash flow sensitivity of investment, as we 
found in table 13-our formula for estimating s predicts that high-margin firms 
with higher q have greater shadow costs of external finance. 
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